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How does Investors' Legal Protection affect Productivity 
and Growth? 
First Draft: May 2009 
Binyamin Berdugo and Sharon Hadad1  
This paper analyzes the implications of investors' legal protection on aggregate 
productivity and growth. We have two main results. First, that better investors' legal 
protection can mitigate agency problems between investors and innovators and therefore 
expand the range of high-tech projects that can be financed by non-bank investors. Second, 
investors' legal protection shifts investment resources from less productive (medium-tech) 
to highly productive (high-tech) projects and therefore enhances economic growth. These 
results stem from two forces. On one hand, private investors' moral hazard problems (in 
which entrepreneurs shift investors' resources to their own benefit), and on the other hand 
innovators' risk of project termination by banks due to wrong signals about projects' 
probability of success. Our results are consistent with recent empirical studies that show a 
high correlation between legal investors' protection and the structure of the financial system 
as well as the economic performance at industry and macroeconomic levels. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
1
 We are grateful to Koresh Galil for helpful comments and discussions. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a large body of literature that explores how legal investors' protection affects 
the structure of the financial system. The main findings of this literature are that the better 
legal investors' protection is, the lower is the concentration of ownership and control and 
the higher is the competition in the financial markets (See Zingales, 1994, La Porta et al., 
1997 Nenova, 2003, Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002; Wurgler, 2000 and Shleifer 
and Wolfenzon (2002)). In recent years, a parallel line of research has emerged that explores 
how the structure of financial systems affects economic activity and performance both at 
the industry and at the macroeconomic level. The most important findings of this growing 
research is that financial development affects innovation and growth positively through their 
beneficial role in R&D investment as well as in the rising of new firms especially in the high-
skill-intensive industries (see Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), Carlin and Mayer (2003), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005)).
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In this paper we provide a theoretical contribution to this literature by linking investors' 
legal protection to the size of high-tech industry, productivity and growth.  The paper has 
two main results. First, that better investors' legal protection can mitigate agency problems 
between investors and innovators and therefore expand the range of high-tech projects that 
can be financed through the financial markets. The second is that investors' legal protection 
shifts investment resources from less productive to highly productive projects and therefore 
enhances economic growth.  
The paper results stem from two forces that derive from the supply and the demand 
sides for funds. From the perspective of fund suppliers, poor investors' legal protection leads 
                                                           
2
 The relation between financial institutions and economic performance has long been a subject for 
historical and empirical inquiry. Hicks (1969), for example, argued that the UK’s financial system 
played a significant role in the Industrial Revolution. King and Levine (1993a and b) utilized data for 
80 countries over the period 1960-1989 and found a robust relationship between growth and financial 
development. 
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to a moral hazard problem whereby entrepreneurs can shift investors' resources to their 
own benefit. This moral hazard reduces the willingness of private investors' to purchase 
firms' equity and therefore diminishes their supply for funds. Poor investors' protection 
thereby narrows the range of projects that can be financed directly through the financial 
market and widens the range of projects that can be financed by debt through financial 
intermediaries (e.g., banks). 
From the perspective of fund seekers, however, raising funds from banks exposes 
innovators to the risk of unjustified termination of projects that emerge when banks obtain 
a wrong signal about a project's probability of success.
3
 This threat of being prematurely 
liquidated might motivate innovators to undertake less productive projects in order to 
reduce the probability of wrong liquidation. The paper therefore concludes that, on one 
hand, better investors' legal protection expands the range of highly productive projects 
(high-tech) that can be financed by non-bank investors (projects that otherwise would not 
have been financed at all) and, on the other hand, narrows the range of less productive 
projects (medium-tech). This shift of investment resources from less productive to highly 
productive projects enhances productivity and growth.    
The main idea of the paper is presented by an endogenous growth model in which a final 
good is produced by a variety of intermediate goods (see Romer (1990)). We assume that 
there are two types of intermediate goods in the economy: high-tech and medium-tech. 
These intermediate goods differ in their productivity rates such that high-tech goods are on 
average more productive than medium-tech goods and therefore generate higher economic 
growth. We also assume that at each period of time, entrepreneurial innovators can invent 
new products that can be employed in the production of the final good. However, in order 
                                                           
3The effect of liquidity risk (i.e., the risk that, a profitable project will have to be prematurely 
liquidateddue to wrong signals received by lenders) on firms' financing choices was studied in 
important works by Diamond (1991a, 1991b)  and Von Thadden (1995). 
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to develop these products innovators need to raise funds either from banks or private 
investors. Both banks and non-bank investors are neither informed about projects 
investment requirements nor are they informed about their probability of success. However, 
unlike private investors, banks are equipped with costly monitoring and auditing 
technologies that enable them to reveal information about the projects they finance (see 
Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990 and King and Levine 1993(b)). Specifically, the monitoring 
technology enables banks to verify whether the innovators' reported amount of investment 
was actually invested in the project, while the auditing technology enables banks to observe 
a noisy signal about the project type. We assume that the signal noise is positively correlated 
with the project risk such that signals for high-tech projects are noisier than signals for 
medium-tech projects.  
In the main text we show that when project investment requirements are lower or equal 
to some threshold value Ω, innovators of such projects do not have an incentive to extract 
perquisites from investment, since their expected earnings are already high and they do not 
want to damage the probability of the success of their projects. Therefore, they will report 
their true investment requirements (which are lower or equal to Ω), and non-bank investors 
will be ready to supply them with funds by purchasing their equity. Under such conditions, 
innovators will prefer to embark on high-tech projects that provide them with higher 
earnings. 
The opposite logic is at work for innovators with projects whose investment 
requirements are higher than the threshold value Ω. Such innovators have an incentive to 
report extravagant investment requirements and to extract perquisites that eventually 
reduces their project's probability of success.  Non-bank investors will therefore not be 
willing to supply funds to projects whose reported investment requirements are higher than 
Ω,  and they will eventually be financed by banks only. Under such conditions, Innovators 
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will prefer to embark on medium-tech projects (with relatively low liquidation risks) rather 
than high-tech projects (with high liquidation risks).  
The results of the paper that investors' legal protection shifts investment resources from 
less productive to highly productive projects is manifested by the positive relation between 
the quality of investor legal protection and the threshold value Ω. The higher the quality of 
investor legal protection is, the lesser is the agency problem that exists between investors 
and innovators and therefore the higher is the threshold value Ω. Since an increase in Ω 
expands the range of high-tech projects that can be financed by non-bank investors and 
narrows the range of medium-tech projects that are financed by banks, we conclude that 
investors' legal protection enhances productivity and growth. 
The theoretical literature on finance and growth is, surprisingly, very sparse, and mostly 
focuses on how financial intermediaries promote growth (See Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990) Bencivega and Smith (1991) and De la Fuente and Marin (1996)). In recent years, 
however, another research has emerged that explores the link between financial institutions 
and the composition of finance (i.e., financial intermediates versus financial markets). One 
branch of this research that is directly related to innovation and growth has focused on how 
institutions that promote credit market decentralization may lead creditors to commit not to 
refinance unprofitable projects that otherwise (in a centralized credit market) would have 
been financed and refinanced even when shown to be unproductive (see Maskin and 
Dewatripont (1995) and Huang and Xu (1999)). In another research, Chakraborty and Ray 
(2006) studied a bank-based versus market-based financial system in an endogenous growth 
model. Their paper is based on monitoring technology of banks that enables banks to 
resolve a moral hazard problem that emerges when managers reduce investment 
profitability to enjoy private benefits. The authors find that while efficiency of financial 
6 
 
institutions positively affect growth, neither a bank-based nor a market-based system is 
unequivocally better for growth.
4
  
Our paper has two important contributions to the theoretical literature on finance and 
growth. First, we provide a direct linkage between investors' legal protection, innovation 
and growth. Second, unlike the existing literature, our paper stresses the important role of 
investor legal protection on innovators' projects choice and financing decisions in the face of 
projects' termination risk by banks. Thus, the mechanism we suggest is not primarily based 
on the supply side for funds (as in the existing literature) but rather emphasizes the effect of 
legal protection on the interaction between the demand and the supply for funds.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model; Section 3 
describes the equilibrium; Section 4; Presents the results on economic growth; Section 5 
concludes; and the mathematical proofs appear in an appendix. 
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 Another important study that is not directly related to economic growth but might have potential 
implications on economic growth, focuses on the effectiveness of financial markets and financial 
intermediaries in financing new industries and technologies in the presence opinion diversity. See 
Allen and Gale who demonstrate that innovative projects that investors have diverse believes about 
their probability of success might be more efficiently financed through the financial market rather than 
banks. 
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2. The Model  
Consider a small open economy whose activities extend over an infinite discrete 
time. The economy consists of three types of goods: a final good Y that is used either 
for consumption or investment, and two types of continuum intermediate goods xi and 
zi which we denote by “medium” and “high,” respectively. Formally, the final good 
production technology is given by the following Lebesgue integral which represents a 
constant return to scale production function:5  
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where [0,Mt] and [0,Ht] are the sets of intermediate goods of type xi and zi, 
respectively, and θx,i and θz,i are the parameters that reflect the productivity type of 
each product i of type x and z, respectively. We assume that: 
(A-1) Each intermediate good i of type x and type z is either highly productive or 
poorly productive such that θx,i∈{θx,low,θx,high} and θz,i∈{θx,low,θx,high}.  
(A-2) Per productivity type, intermediate goods of type z are more productive than 
intermediate goods of type x. Specifically: θx,low < θz,low< θx,high < θz,high. 
However, as will be clarified later, intermediate goods of type z are much more 
risky than intermediate goods of type x. 
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 The reason we choose to present the production technology with a Lebesgue integral rather than the 
ordinary Riemann integral is that the productivity of each intermediate good is stochastic and therefore 
the upper and the lower Riemann summations do not converge.  It is easy to verify, however, that under 
very weak assumptions (and without loss of generality) the integrand in equation (1) is Lebesgue 
measurable (and therefore according to the dominated convergence theorem it is also Lebesgue 
inferable) since it can be approached by simple functions.  
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The final good Y is assumed to be perfectly tradable, but the intermediate goods 
and labor are domestic. Capital is perfectly mobile. The world interest rate is r*, and 
the gross investment rate is R*=1+r*.  
 
2.1 Individuals  
At each period t, a generation of two types of individuals is born:  a set [0,L] of 
individuals who we label as "households" and a set ],0( ν of individuals who we label 
as "innovators". Both types of individuals live for two periods each, but possess 
different skills and different preferences. 
Households have identical standard additive and separable preferences over 
consumption in their first and second periods of life ( ttc and 
t
tc 1+ , respectively), such 
that:  
)()(),( 11 ttttttttt cUcUccuu ++ ⋅Θ+==       (2) 
We also assume that households supply one unit of labor in their first period of life 
and retire in their second period.  
Unlike households, innovators do not work, however, they are gifted with an 
innovative skill that enables them to invent new products and consequently to extend 
the variety of intermediate goods that already operate in the final good sector. 
Specifically, we assume that at each period t, a generation of (0,v] innovators is born. 
Each innovator ],0( ν∈i  is matched to two new products prototypes  one of type x 
and one of type z, but can undertake one project only. The matching functions 
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)(iMτ and )(iHτ  for product prototypes x and z are given by 
],(],0(: 11 −− ⋅Γ→ ttM BMvτ  and ],(],0(: 11 −− ⋅Γ→ ttH BHvτ , respectively,  such that: 
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where Mt-1 and Ht-1 denote the numbers of intermediate goods of type x and z that has 
been already engaged in the production of the final good Y at time t-1, 1−tB  is the 
stock of knowledge that was accumulated until period t-1, and  1>Γ is a constant 
parameter that represents potential growth of knowledge due to inventive activities 
(see Figure 1 below).6 We assume that the stock of knowledge that was accumulated 
until period t-1 is positively correlated with the variety of intermediate goods of type x 
and z. Specifically, 111 −−− += ttt HMB .
7
   
We further assume that: 
(A-3) Each innovator j is characterize by an idiosyncratic, independently and 
identically distributed ability variable ],[)( AAjA ∈  with a distribution 
function F(a). The variable )( jA  reflects the jth innovator's ability to reduce 
his projects' investment requirements.  The lower )( jA is, the higher is the 
innovator's ability to reduce investment requirements in the projects he 
might develop.  
(A- 4) The ability variable )( jA  is the innovator's  j private knowledge. 
                                                           
6
 The assumption that the numbers of innovators is fixed while the stock of knowledge is growing 
steadily was assumed by Romer (1990). Although we do not assume growth without scale effect (such 
as in Young (1998)), the model can be easily adjusted to such settings (this is left for future work).   
7
 This additive function was chosen for simplicity only, and the results of the paper carry through with 
other functions as long as { }111 ,max −−− ≥ ttt HMB . 
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Figure 1 
 
If an innovator undertakes an x-project, and the project is not interrupted, then he 
eventually comes up with a new product of type x which is either highly productive 
(θx,high) or poorly productive (θx,low). Similarly, if an innovators embarks on a z-
project, and the project is not interrupted, then he eventually comes up with a new 
product of type z which is either highly productive or less productive (i.e., θz,high or 
θz,low). It is assumed that ex-ante, innovators do not know ex-ante whether the project 
they undertake is productive or not but know the respective probabilities. 
Innovators are born with no wealth and that gain utility from two related sources. 
First, they gain utility from perquisites they might possibly earn in their first period of 
life, by reporting extravagant investment. Second, in their second period of life, 
innovators gain utility from their share in the project's profits. Innovators can also 
have disutility from potential profits they do not earn when their project does not 
reach completion. Formally, the innovators utility function from a project is given by:  
TqVW += )|)(( piϕ      (4)    
0     i     v 
Mt-1     τM(i)   ΓAt-1 Ht-1   τH(i)  ΓAt-1 
)(iMτ  
)(iHτ
 
0 0 
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where T denotes the resources that an innovator can extract from investors by 
reporting them incorrect investment expenditures, pi denotes operating profits of a 
project when it is not liquidated, )(piϕ denote the innovator's share in the project's 
operating profits pi, and q∈{p,l} denote two possible actions that investors (namely 
banks) might possibly take subsequent to their "set-up" investment: (1) proceed with 
the project (q=p) or (2) liquidate the project (q=l). We assume that the innovators' 
utility function satisfies the following conditions. 
(A-5) If q=p then )|)(( qV piϕ  is a monotonically increasing and concave function 
where 0)|0( =qV  (i.e., 0)(
)|)((
>
∂
=∂
piϕ
piϕ pqV
 and  0)(
)|)((
2
2
>
∂
=∂
piϕ
piϕ pqV ).8 
(A-6) (references-dependence and loss-aversion) Given that investors' decision is to 
stop (liquidate) the project before the project reaches maturity, innovators' 
utility is lower, the higher are the losses of innovators' potential earning from 
the project's profits. Thus, 0)(
)|)((
<
∂
=∂
piϕ
piϕ lqV
.  
(A-7) For the sake of simplicity we assume that innovators attribute the same absolute 
value to losses and gains, such that:  
)|)(()|)(( lqVpqV =−== piϕpiϕ .9  
 
                                                           
8
 This assumption implies that whenever q=p, innovators' utility is higher the higher are the earnings from the 
project's profits. 
9
 The experimental literature about reference-dependence and loss aversion as well as about the 
endowment affect suggests that )|)(()|)(( lqupqu =−≤= piϕpiϕ which only reinforces the 
results of our model. (see, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990)) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991) 
and Knetsch (1992)).  
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 3. Equilibrium 
Let the final good Y serve as a numeraire. Profit maximization by firms who 
produce the final good Y leads to the following first-order conditions:  
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  which implies that the demand for intermediate goods is given by: 
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Suppose that, once invented, intermediate goods of type x and z cost one unit of the 
finial good Y to produce (i.e., each unit of the final good Y can be transformed into 
one unit of an intermediate good x or z). We assume that technologies cannot be 
adopted within less than one period and therefore innovators who just invented an 
intermediate good become monopolistic producers for one period only and at the end 
of this period are replaced by competitive firms. New products are therefore produced 
by monopolistic firms, while old vintage products are produced by competitive firms. 
Since old vintage products are purchased from competitive firms, their prices must be 
equal to their marginal cost which equals one (i.e., 1)()( == ii zpxp ). By substituting 
these prices into equation (6) we get that the demands for old vintage products are: 
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If, however, final good producers purchase new products, they must pay 
monopolistic prices: 
11)()( >== αixiz PP       (8) 
By substituting equation (8) into equation (6) we get that the quantities produced by 
monopolists of products of types x and z are:  
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and that the monopolists operating profits are:  
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By substituting (7) and (9) into (1) we get that 
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3.1 Investment  
In order to launch a project jx of type x (or a project jz of type z), a certain 
investment is required. Each project has a unique investment threshold value which is 
identical to the innovator's ability A(j) (see assumption (A-3) above). If the investment 
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is lower than this threshold value then the probability that the produced product will 
be highly productive is low. If, on the other hand, the amount of investment is higher 
or equal to this threshold value then the probability that the product will be highly 
productive is high. Formally, let a denote the amount of resources invested in a 
certain project. The probability that a project of type x (a project of type z) is highly 
productive is given by the following distribution function: 
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where 21
210 <<< xx ββ  and 21
210 <<< zz ββ  are the conditional probabilities of the 
project's success (which depends on the respective investment a), and *)( jAx and 
*)( jAz are the investment thresholds values of projects  jx and jz which (as described 
in assumption (A-4) are idiosyncratic independently and identically distributed 
variables with a distribution function F(a) on the interval ],[ AA ) (see Figure 2 
below). 
Intermediate goods of type z are less likely to succeed than intermediate goods of type 
x (i.e., 110 xz ββ <<  , and 220 xz ββ << ), however, intermediate goods of type z are 
much more  productive, on average, than intermediate goods of type x, such that:  
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Figure 2 
  
The assumption that the variable )()()( ** iAiAiA zx ==  is the innovator's i private 
knowledge implies that information asymmetry exists between investors and 
innovators. This informational asymmetry might cause a moral hazard problem, 
whereby innovators have incentives to report extravagant investment threshold values 
while extracting investment resources to their own benefits. The corporate finance 
literature has extensively investigated the issue of how and under what conditions 
such a moral hazard problem can be mitigated by different investors such as private 
investors and financial intermediaries. It is widely recognized that different types of 
investors have different abilities to deal with such a moral hazard problem through 
monitoring. In the framework of our model the differences between private investors 
and financial intermediaries are characterized by assumptions (A-8)-(A-13):  
0                  A          *)( jAz          A                                            A              *)( jAx          A  
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 (A-8) Private investors' access to monitoring technology is limited such that they 
cannot, ex ante, distinguish between innovators who truthfully report their 
projects' investment requirements and innovators who report false investment 
requirements (while at the same time extract investment resources).10  
(A-9)  In contrast to private investors, commercial banks have access to a costly 
monitoring technology that enables them to verify whether the reported 
amount of investment was actually invested in the project. Formally, if an 
innovator reports either a true or a false report about his investment threshold 
value )( xreportx jA  or )( zreportz jA  the bank can verify whether the amount 
)( xreportx jA  or )( zreportz jA  was invested in the project. We assume that 
monitoring cost per-project is proportional to the innovator's reported size of 
investment, which is given by )( xreportx jAd ⋅  and )( zreportz jAd ⋅ ) for projects  jx 
of type x and jz of type z, respectively (where d>0 is a constant parameter).11  
(A-10)  After investment and before a project reaches maturity, each innovator can 
costlessly observe a noisy signal s(j) about his  project type. The probability 
that the signal s(j) agrees with the correct type of project j is  121 << jγ .12  
(A-11) The signal noise is positively correlated with the project risk such that signals 
for high-tech projects are noisier than signals for medium-tech projects. Thus, 
                                                           
10
 For instance, outside shareholders access to monitoring technology is very limited and extremely expansive due 
to free-rider problems among different investors (See Grossman and Hart (1980) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). 
11
 The corporate finance literature often regards commercial banks as consortiums of investors who delegate the 
monitoring function to a single market participant (the bank), and thereby reduce the cost of monitoring for each 
investor (see Gale and Hellwig (1985)). 
12
 Note that jγ−1 reflects the degree to which the signal s(j) is noisy with respect to the correct type of the 
project j. Note also that the probabilities of signals' errors of type I and II (i.e., liquidating a good project and 
continuing a bad project) are identical. This is a simplifying assumption, and the results of the model carry through 
for a variety of errors' probabilities for of type I and II. 
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the signals sx(jx) of projects of type x are less noisy than signals sz(jz) of 
projects of type z.  Formally, we assume that for all 10 ≤< δ  
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(A-12) Unlike private investors, commercial banks can acquire the noisy signals sx(jx) 
and sz(jz)for projects jx and jz that they might finance, by paying an additional 
payment which is proportional to the reported size of investment 
( )( xreportx jA and )( zreportz jA ). This payment is given by )( xreportx jAq ⋅  and 
)( zreportz jAq ⋅ , respectively (where 0<q<1 is a constant parameter).14 
(A-13)  It is more costly for commercial banks to monitor and audit foreign projects 
than to monitor and audit domestic ones. In the context of our model this 
assumption implies that the aforementioned parameters d and q that express 
the banks monitoring and auditing costs for domestic projects are lower than 
the corresponding parameters for foreign projects df and qf, respectively. 
 
 3.2 The Supply for Funds 
 Banks 
To keep the analysis simple we describe the commercial banks' investment 
process in two sequential stages. In the first stage, each innovator either truthfully or 
falsely reports his project's investment threshold value )( xreportx jA  (or )( zreportz jA ) and 
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 This condition holds for example when ⋅=⋅)(V and xγ  is sufficiently higher than zγ . 
14
 The assumption that the signal's cost is proportional to the size of investment was made to simplify the proofs of 
Lemmas 1 and 2. The results of the model carry through with fixed costs as well.  
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then, after the bank receives all projects' reports, the bank selects a random sample of 
projects to monitor.15 In the second stage, each innovator obtains a noisy signal s(j). 
Banks acquire these noisy signals by paying an amount )( xreportx jAq ⋅ or )( zreportz jAq ⋅ , 
for projects  jx of type x and jz of type z, respectively.  The structure of information for 
innovators, banks and outside shareholders is summarized in Table 1below. 
 
Table 1 
 
Stage 1 
Information about the 
investment threshold value 
Ax(jx)  Az(jz) 
Stage 2 
Information about the productivity 
of the project 
Innovators 
(entrepreneurs)  
Know the actual investment costs 
Ax(jx)  Az(jz) 
 
Costlessly observe a signal s∈{high, low} such 
that:
 
P(s=high| t=high)=γ>1/2 
P(s=low | t=high)=1-γ<1/2 
P(s=low| t=low)= γ>1/2 
P(s=low | t=low)= 1-γ<1/2 
Outside 
shareholders 
Do not know Ax(jx)  Az(jz) but know 
the prior distribution F(a)  
Know only the prior probabilities β and 
β−1 but do not know the actual productivity 
of the project 
Banks 
 
Initially, do not know Ax(jx)  Az(jz) but 
know the prior distribution F(a). 
However, they can costly verify 
innovators reports.  
Can acquire a costly signal s∈{high, low} such 
that: 
P(s=high| t=high)=γ>1/2 
P(s=low | t=high)=1-γ<1/2 
P(s=low| t=low)= γ>1/2 
P(s=low | t=low)= 1-γ<1/2 
 
                                                           
15
 It is important to emphasize that at this stage both banks and innovators know only the ex-ante distribution of 
the project's productivity type, but do not know its precise realization. 
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After the bank's investment was made and a noisy signal about the project's type 
was observed, the bank can decide whether to continue the project or prematurely 
liquidate it. Assumptions (A-14)-(A-16) characterize the banks alternatives decisions 
and their consequences: 
(A-14) If a project is liquidated, then the innovator is inevitably left with zero profits 
while the bank obtains a fraction 21>ξ  of his initial investment. The 
liquidation value of projects of type },{ zxl∈ can therefore be given 
by )( jAreportl⋅ξ , where:   
   
highzzlowzz
highxxlowxx
A
A
,
1
,
1
,
1
,
1
)1(
)1(
piβpiβξ
piβpiβξ
⋅−+⋅>⋅
⋅−+⋅>⋅
    
(A-15) If the bank continues the project but the project fails (i.e., the intermediate 
good turns out to be poorly productive (i.e., lowll ,θθ = ) then the bank can claim 
the entire project's operating profits lowl ,pi  .These operating profits, however, 
are always lower than that the bank's initial investment, since the required 
investments in all projects are assumed to be higher than the operating profits 
of projects that eventually turn out to be unproductive. Specifically: 
A
A
lowz
lowx
<
<
,
,
pi
pi
 
 (A-16) If, on the other hand, the project proceeds and succeeds the banks can get a 
fraction 10 <<φ  of the projects' profit while innovators get the residual 
fraction φ−1  . It is assumed that )(⋅φ  is determined by the innovators 
bargaining power vis-à-vis banks which is an increasing function of the 
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innovators reported investment value reportlA   the higher 
report
lA  is, the lower 
is the innovator bargaining power vis-à-vis banks and the higher is φ .  
The two following Lemmas provides the conditions under which a bank will be 
willing to supply funds to a project as well as the  bank's optimal monitoring policy.  
Lemma 1: If assumptions (A-8)-(A-16) are satisfied and a bank does not have 
information about the threshold investment value of the project j of type },{ zxl∈ it 
finances then given the reported threshold investment value reportlA  the bank will issue 
a debt contract:  
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Under such conditions, the bank's income from the project is: 
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Lemma 2: If assumptions (A-8)-(A-16) hold and a bank does not have information 
about the threshold investment value of the project j of type },{ zxl∈ it finances then 
given the reported threshold investment value reportlA  the bank's optimal monitoring 
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policy that keeps innovators at least indifferent between reporting a true and false 
investment requirement is to inspect a fraction 1)(0 << reportlAδ  of projects of type l 
such that:16 
)()|))(1(()21(
)|))(1(()21(
1)(
,
1
,
2
l
report
lhighl
report
lll
highl
report
lllreport
l AApqAV
pqAV
A
−+=⋅−−
=⋅−⋅−⋅
−=
piφβγ
piφγβ
δ        (12) 
Proof: See appendix 
Obviously, a bank will not lend resources to a project j of type },{ zxl∈  unless it can 
charge payments with an expected rate of return that are, at the very least, equal to the 
world gross interest rate *R . Specifically, the bank's individual-rationality condition 
is necessarily given by:  

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   (13) 
Without loss of generality, we assume henceforth that all innovators have a sufficient 
bargaining power (vis-à-vis banks) to secure for themselves the highest possible 
earnings from their projects' profits while banks can only cover their opportunity 
costs. This assumption implies that , if a bank finances a project j of type },{ zxl∈  
and the project turns out to be productive then the bank gets a fraction 1)(0 <⋅< φ  of 
the projects' profit such that:17 
                                                           
16
 Note that equation (12) is equivalent to an incentive compatible condition for borrowers.   
17
 This assumption may seem rather restrictive to some readers. However, the assumption that banks can only 
cover their opportunity costs does not limit the generality of our theory and even reinforces its results. As will 
become apparent the results of the model carry through even if the required rate of return on equities and banks' 
assets are equal to the world interest rate R*.  
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Private Investors 
Assumptions (A-8)-(A-16) imply that, unlike banks, private investors have very 
limited control over the investment process, which leads to conditions under which 
innovators might have incentives to report extravagant investment values and to 
extract perquisites to their own benefit. Take for instance an innovator with a project j 
of type },{ zxl∈  whose investment threshold value is given by Al*(j). This innovator 
can extract resources from private investors by reporting an investment threshold 
value lreportl AA >  and invest only lA  (where lA is the lowest amount of investment 
that keeps the project l profits above zero (see Figure 2). The innovator therefore 
reduces his project's probability of success from 2lβ to 1lβ , on the one hand, but, on 
the other hand, gains perquisites of the amount )( lreportl AA − . It is easy to see that the 
innovator has an incentive to extract project's resources to his own benefit if and only 
if the marginal resource he extracts exceeds the utility loss from lowering the 
expected project's profits. Formally, the innovator has an incentive to extract an 
amount )( lreportl AA −  if and only if: 
)]|))(~1(()|))(~1(()1[(
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2
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(15) 
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where 1)(~0 << reportlAφ  is the investors' share in the project's profit (as a function of 
the reported investment threshold value reportlA ) (see Figure (3) below). 18 Inequality 
(15) implies that when a project is financed through the market by private investors 
(outside shareholders) an innovator would report his true investment threshold value 
)(* jAA lreportl =  if and only if 
    )()(* ljAl Ω≤           (16) 
where  ( ) ( )[ ])))(~1(()))(~1(()()(
,,
12
lowlhighlll lVlVAl piφpiφββ Ω−−Ω−−+=Ω .  
The rationale of this condition is straightforward. Innovators with projects such 
that )()(* ljAl Ω≤ would not have an incentive to extract perquisites from investment 
resources, since their expected earnings are already high and they do not want to 
damage their projects' probability of success. Since private investors can derive 
inequalities (15) and (16) they would be ready to supply funds only to all projects of 
types },{ zxl∈  whose reported investment values are at most )(lΩ  and will be 
reluctant to supply funds to projects whose  reported investment values exceeds )(lΩ . 
Thus, the range of projects of type },{ zxl∈  that can be financed by private investors 
is necessarily limited by the threshold investment value )(~ lΩ , while banks who are 
equipped with monitoring technology will be ready to finance projects with 
)()( ljAreportl Ω> .  
 
                                                           
18As will become apparent, equilibrium stock price implies that the investors' share in their projects' 
profit )(~ reportlAφ is an increasing function of the reported investment value reportlA .  
24 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
Shareholders Protection 
We now describe how legal protection for shareholders rights affects private 
investors supply for funds.  We borrow from Becker (1968) "crime and punishment" 
and from Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) and assume 
that the quality of investors protection is given by the likelihood that the innovator is 
caught and fined for expropriating from shareholders. Specifically, if an innovator is 
caught, he is fined and forced to return the diverted amount to the project. In addition, 
the entire project's profits are distributed as dividends to shareholders. Thus, 
according to assumptions (A-4) and (A-5), the innovator not only reduces his project's 
probability of success from 2lβ to 
1
lβ , but also risks utility losses (see assumptions (A-
6) and (A-7). Let 0<χ<1 denote the probability that an innovator who diverts 
investment resources is caught and let c denote the innovator's cost from being sued 
A  A  )(lAΩ  
LHS  
report
lA  
RHS  
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and fined. By applying the same logic as in inequality (16) we find that an innovator, 
whose offers share to the public would report his true investment threshold value  
(i.e., )(* jAA lreportl = ) if and only if: 
    ),,(~)(* cljAl χΩ≤                                                         (17) 
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since the breakeven point ),,(~ cl χΩ is an increasing function of χ and c, we conclude 
that the better investors' protection is, the wider is the range of projects that private 
investors are willing to finance (see Figure (4) below).     
Figure 4 
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The Required Return on Equity 
Before we turn to analyze the innovators' decision problem and to describe the 
demand for funds we must first determine the required rate of return on equity.  
Lemma 3: The required rate of return on equity for all projects j of type },{ zxl ∈  
such that )()(* ljAl Ω≤ ), is necessarily equal to the world gross interest rate R*. 
Proof: According to the CCAPM model, the expected rate of return of any risky asset 
j must satisfy the following equilibrium condition: 19  
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However, since in our model, all projects' expected rate of return are independently 
distributed, their risks can be fully diversified as long as outside shareholders can 
truthfully reveal their projects' investment values *)( jA . Thus, stocks' gross expected 
rate of return must be equal to the risk free alternative investment opportunity (i.e., 
the world's gross interest rate R*). 
 Lemma 3 implies that whenever private investors can truthfully reveal projects' 
investment values )(* jAl , the innovators have a sufficient bargaining power (vis-à-vis 
private investors) to keep investors indifferent between purchasing projects' equity 
                                                           
19
  For any risky asset j, and for any risk free asset B*, the Euler conditions for consumers' must satisfy: 
 1) [ ]jtttt RcUcU )()( 11 +− ′Θ=′ E  and 2) [ ]*)()( 11 RcUcU tttt +− ′Θ=′ E . These two conditions lead 
to the CCAPM expected return condition: [ ] [ ])(/),(cov*)( 11 ttjttj cURcURR ++ ′′−= EE .   
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and purchasing assets that yield the world interest rate.20 According to Lemma 3 and 
condition (14) the required rate of return on equities as well as on banks assets are 
equal to the world interest rate R* and therefore savers will be willing to finance all 
types of projects whether by purchasing equity (if )()( ljAreportl Ω≤ ) or through banks. 
 
3.3 The Demand for Funds 
 Until now we have described the supply for funds by showing how 
informational asymmetries affect banks and private investors' decisions. We now turn 
to describe the demand for funds. In our model, each innovator j must make two 
related decisions. First, he must decide whether to undertake a project of type x or z 
and then he must decide whether to raise funds by borrowing from a bank or by 
offering shares to the public. These two decision problems are closely related to two 
issues that were previously pointed out.  The first issue is whether an innovator can or 
cannot raise finance by offering equity to the public. We have seen that due to moral 
hazard problem an innovator cannot raise finance from private investors if his 
project's threshold investment value is higher than ),,(~ cl χΩ (see condition (17) 
above). This condition implies that the poorer investors' protection is the smaller is 
the range of projects that can be financed by selling equity and the larger is the range 
of projects that can be financed solely by banks. The second issue is the risk of 
                                                           
20
 Specifically, Lemma 3 implies that the share of outside investors in the projects' profit as a function 
of its investment value is given by: 
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unjustified liquidation that an innovator must take when he raises funds by borrowing 
from banks (see assumptions (A-12)-(A-14) and Lemma 1). Such a liquidation risk 
might leads innovators to undertake less profitable projects only because the 
probability of auditing errors (and thereby unjustified liquidation) is lower. We now 
show how investors' moral hazard problems, on the one hand, and liquidation risk 
(due to auditing errors) on the other hand impinge on innovators decisions. 
Specifically we demonstrate that better investors' protection rules (which lessen the 
investors' moral hazard problem) lead innovators to undertake a higher numbers of 
high-tech projects. This leads to the main result of the paper that investors' protection 
intensifies investment in high-tech projects and increases economic growth.  
Lemma 4: If projects' signal errors lγ−1  are sufficiently high (i.e., lγ−1  lies in some 
interval ],[ 21lz where 210 ≤≤ lz  is sufficiently high), then innovators will always 
prefer to raise funds for their  projects by offering equities to private investors rather 
than by borrowing from banks. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Lemma 4 simply states that if a project's signal error is sufficiently high, then due to 
the high probability of bank's auditing error and thereby high risk of unjustified 
liquidation by the bank, the innovator would prefer to raise funds by offering equity to 
the public rather than from borrowing from banks.   
We henceforth assume that: 
 (A-17)  All projects' signal errors lγ−1  are sufficiently high such that Lemma 4 
holds.  
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(A-18) Whenever a product of type z turns out to be productive its contribution to the 
production of the final good Y is remarkably higher than that of products of 
type x. Formally, z,highθ  is sufficiently higher than highx,θ  such that for all 
10 ≤< δ the following condition holds:21 
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Proposition 1: Suppose that assumptions (A-17) and (A-18) are satisfied. Consider an 
innovator j with ability ],[)( AAjA ∈ . 
(i) If ),,()( czjA χΩ≤  (where ),,( xz χΩ is as in inequality (18)), then the 
innovator would embark on his z project and would raise funds by offering 
equity to private investors. 
(ii) Otherwise the innovator would embark on his x project and would raise funds 
by borrowing from a bank. 
Proof: see Appendix 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
21
 This condition implies that whenever a product of type z turns out to be productive then its 
contribution to the production of the final good Y is remarkably higher than that of product of type x. 
This condition holds for example when ⋅=⋅)(V and z,highθ  is sufficiently high.  
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4. Economic Growth  
From Proposition 1 and assumption (A-3) we can deduce that the number of 
innovators who undertake a project of type z is ( )),,( czF χν Ω⋅ , while the number of 
innovators who embark on projects of type x is ( )( )),,(1 czF χν Ω−⋅ .22  Proposition 1 
and assumption (A-3) and (A-4) allow us to calculate the number of new intermediate 
goods that are produced at each period t (see Table 2 below).  
Table 2 
The product type  The number of intermediate goods that are 
produced at period t from each product type 
Product x with productivity lowx,θ  ( ) ( )( ) 12 ),,,(11 −⋅Ω−⋅⋅−Γ txx BczF χγβ  
Product x with productivity highx,θ  ( ) ( )( ) 12 ),,,(1)1)(1(1 −⋅Ω−⋅−−⋅−Γ txx BczF χγβ  
Product z with productivity lowz ,θ  ( ) ( ) 12 ),,()1(1 −⋅Ω⋅−⋅−Γ tz BczF χβ  
Product z with productivity highz ,θ  ( ) ( ) 12 ),,(1 −⋅Ω⋅⋅−Γ tz BczF χβ  
 
The most important implication of Proposition 1 is that better investors' protection 
rules (as manifested by the parameters χ and c) increase the variety of high-tech 
products while decreasing the variety of medium tech products. that is, the higher 
),,( cz χΩ  is (see inequality (17)) the larger is the number of innovators who would 
                                                           
22
 Assumption (A-18) is a simplifying assumption. The results of the paper carry through even if 
z,highθ  is higher than highx,θ  but not sufficiently higher such that ),,(~),,(~ czcx χχ Ω>Ω . Due to 
assumption (A-18) Proposition 1 implies that all projects of type x are financed by banks while projects 
of type z are financed by non-bank investors. Assumption (A-18), however, does not limit the 
generality of the model since even if we relax this assumption we still obtain the result that better 
investors' protection rules increase the number of projects that are financed by non-bank investors, and 
that the number of z projects rise. 
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undertake a project of type z and the lower is the number of innovators who would 
undertake a project of type x.  
 We now examine how investors' protection rules affect output, wages and 
growth. From Table 2 and equation (11) we get that the level of output at each period 
t is given by:   
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From equation (18) we can immediately deduce that (i) the level of output Yt ; (ii) the 
wage rate wt and (iii) the output growth rates must be positively related with the 
quality of investors protection rules (as manifested by the parameters χ and c). First, it 
is easy to see that if Yt is an increasing function of χ and c, then the wage rate wt must 
also be positively related with χ and c since profit maximization by firms who 
produce the final good Y leads to the first order condition: 
L
Y
wt )1( α−= . 
The level of output Yt is an increasing function of χ and c since sz>sx and since 
),,( cz χΩ  is positively related with χ and c. By applying the same arithmetic on 
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 we get that investors' protection rules increase the rates of economic 
growth. 
Proposition 2 summarizes the results of the paper. 
Proposition 2: An enhancement in the quality of investors' protection rules 
(i) Increases the number of innovators who undertake a project of type z and 
(weakly) decrease the number of innovators who undertake projects of type x; 
(ii) Increases the number of projects that are financed by non-bank investors and 
decreases the number of projects that are financed by banks; 
(iii) Increases output;  
(iv)  Increases wage rates; and last 
(v) Increases growth rates. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
New empirical studies that have recently emerged showed that legal protection for 
private investors is not only important for the structure of the financial market but also 
for economic structure and performance both at the industry and the macroeconomic 
level. The chief contribution of this paper is that it demonstrates a new economic 
mechanism through which these empirical findings can be derived. We show that 
investors' protection affects both the supply and the demand side for funds. On one 
hand it increases the range of risky projects that private investors are willing to 
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finance (projects that otherwise would not have been financed at all), and, on the other 
hand, it increases the number of innovators who are able to change their financial 
structure from bank loans to market funds. Legal protection for investors therefore:1) 
expands the range of the most advanced, risky and productive sector (high-tech) while 
reducing the relative size of less advanced, less risky and less productive sector; 2) 
shifts resources from the medium to the high-tech sector; and 3) raises aggregate 
output, wages and growth. 
  
 
Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
The bank monitoring policy (i.e., the lowest inspection probabilities )( reportxAδ and 
)( reportxAδ that satisfy the innovators incentive compatible condition). Consider an 
innovator j who embarked on a project x and seeks to extract perquisites by reporting 
a certain investment value )( jAreportx  and then extracting AjAreportx −)( to his own 
private benefits (note that by doing so the innovator reduces the project's probability 
of success from 2xβ to 
1
xβ ).  
• If the innovator's project (j) is scrutinized by the bank, then the bank finds out 
that the innovator did not invest an amount AjAreportx −)( , and therefore the 
bank liquidates the project (while leaves the innovator with zero utility).  
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• If, however, project j is left unscrutinized by the bank, then the innovator 
extract an amount AjAreportx −)( to his own benefit in addition to his share in 
the project's expected profits. Note, however, that the bank who still observes 
a noisy signal (see assumption (A-10)) might liquidate the project if the signal 
indicates that the project is bad.  
Hence, whenever an innovator extracts resources to his own benefits his expected 
utility is necessarily: 
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If, on the other hand, the innovator j reports his true investment value and allocate all 
the funds to the project. Under such condition, the innovator's expected utility is given 
by: 
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Equations (*), (**) as well as assumption (A-5)-(A-7) imply that, the incentive 
compatible condition for innovators to truthfully reveal their investment value and to 
allocate all the funds to their project (i.e., ( ) ( )21 VV EE ≤ ) holds as long as the innovator's 
inspection probability )( reportxAδ  is sufficiently high such that:23  
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 Note that (***) ensures that the innovators will not be better-off by extracting resources to their own benefit 
(i.e., ( ) ( )21 VV EE ≤ ). 
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Proof of Lemma 4: For a project j of type },{ zxl ∈ , an innovator will prefer to raise 
funds from the public (rather than borrowing from a bank) if and only if  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ]lqjAVpqjAV
pqjVpqjAV
highlllhighllll
lowllhighlll
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2
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This inequality holds if the condition (*) below holds for all 10 ≤≤ δ : 
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If 21=lγ then obviously (*) holds.  
Now since 21
2 <lβ it must be that 0))(
~1( * >− lAφ  is an increasing function of lγ and 
therefore there exists an interval ],[ 21 lz such that that condition (*) holds for all 
],[ 21 ll z∈γ .   
Proof of Proposition 1: If { }),,(),,,(min)( czcxjA χχ ΩΩ≤ , then according to 
lemma 4 the innovator would raise funds for his project (either x or z) by offering 
equity to private investors. The condition under which an innovator would prefer to 
embark on his z project rather than his x project is given by:  
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This inequality holds if ( ) ( )( ) ( )pqVpqV
pqVpqV
lowzhighz
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 for all 0>δ (which 
according to assumption (A-19) holds). Thus, if an innovator j has an ability 
parameter ],[)( AAjA ∈  such that { }),,(),,,(min)( czcxjA χχ ΩΩ≤  then the 
innovator would prefer to undertake his z project (rather than his x project) and will 
raise funds by offering equities to private investors. 
Now since assumption (A-18) also implies that ),,(~),,(~ czcx χχ Ω<Ω then either 
statement (i) holds (i.e., ),,()( czjA χΩ≤ ) and the innovator embarks on his z project, 
or ),,(),,()( cxczjA χχ Ω>Ω>  and then the innovator can raise funds (for both 
projects) only by borrowing form a bank.  
Under such conditions, the innovator would prefer to embark on his x project rather 
that his z project if and only if 
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If and only if 
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 for every 10 ≤< δ , which holds due 
to assumption (A-). 
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